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The purpose of this paper is to investigate some issues of wage setting in order to 
assess if nominal inertia and wage flexibility characterize the Italian supply side, 
using multivariate cointegration models. Our estimates indicate that an explicit 
distinction between stationary and non-stationary variables and a joint analysis of 
long-run and short-run structure is crucial for achieving clearer results. To this 
end, we use quarterly time series data for manufacturing industry 1976:1-1993:4. 
Interesting results have been found concerning the empirical evidence of a long- 
run wage curve and the existence of a Phillips curve, through adopting alternative 
order reduction of the 1(2) wage and price variables. Moreover some insights on 























































































































































































The purpose of this paper is to investigate some issues of wage setting in order to 
assess if nominal inertia and wage flexibility characterize the Italian supply side, 
using multivariate cointegration models. The literature on wage curve or wage 
setting in Italy is somewhat limited1. Some information comes from multi-country 
analyses (Bean et al. 1986; Grubb 1986; Layard at al 1991), other from macro- 
econometric models of the Italian economy (e.g. Modigliani et al. 1986; Baici 
1992; Chiarini 1993; Terlizzese 1993; Tivegna 1993), but the existing empirical 
evidence on wage responsiveness to unemployment, wedge and labour 
productivity is rather unsatisfactory.
Several studies show significant effects of unemployment, others find no 
unemployment effect at all. Moreover, results on productivity and wedge effects 
are not homogeneous. All of this has obvious implications for macro-policy. For 
instance, in fighting against inflation", different policy mixes between pegged 
exchange rate, fiscal austerity and monetary restriction have been endorsed as 
alternative strategies to eliminate inflation differential, but how long it will take 
for the economy to shrink the initial differential and how much it will cost in 
terms of unemployment and output depends very much on nominal rigidities (see, 
Blanchard and Muet 1993 and Chiarini 1996 a,b, among others).
Our estimates indicate that an explicit distinction between stationary and non- 
stationary variables and a joint analysis of long-run and short-run structure is 
crucial for achieving better results. To this end, we use quarterly time series data 
for manufacturing industry 1976:1-1993:4.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 the economic background is 
reported briefly. In Section 2 an unrestricted VAR model is specified and the 
analysis of cointegration is discussed. This is done by first estimating the 
cointegration space (Johansen 1988; Johansen and Juselius 1990) and then testing 
more specific hypotheses of economic interest within this space (Johansen and 
Juselius 1992; 1994). As a crucial issue, we replace the 1(2) variables, wages and 
prices, with the 1(1) alternative real wage. In Section 3 a "structural model" for 
the determination of the Italian wage is estimated using the derived short-run 
VAR in error correction form (VECM) with the cointegration relationships 
explicitly included. Section 4 goes back to the VAR in the 1(1) space, adopting a
1 We wish to thank M. Artis, S. Vinci. M. Salmon, G. Oneto, M. Tivegna, and the participants 
of the Conference "The Political Economy of an Integrated Europe", EUI, Florence, november 
1996, for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to R. Mosconi for helpful 



























































































different solution for 1(2) variables, wages and prices, focusing on the outcome of 
relaxing the short-run homogeneity assumption. In Section 5 an impulse-response 
analysis of the systems is illustrated. Results and implications are drawn in the 
economic identification paragraph at the end of the latter two sections, while 
some concluding comments can be found in Section 6.
Model diagnostic tests and cointegration analysis results are gathered in the 
Appendix.
1. Economic Background
The wage is determined through collective bargaining. Unions and firms 
(employers' federation) bargain over wage (W), and possibly employment (N), 
and firms retain the right to manage. Conventional bargaining models can be 
utilized, such as the following asymmetric Nash bargaining solution: max [U 
(W,N)- U° ]“ [£2 (W,N)-f2°] 1_a , with 0<a<l and where U° and £2° stand for the 
status quo outcomes, and U is the utility for unions and W° is the profit for firms. 
This mechanism of determining wages provides "the most general form of wage 
equation" (e.g. Nickell 1988; Layard and Nickell 1985). We may assume that real 
profits are a function of (Y/N) and (W/Q), Q is the price of output: Q* = Q 
(W/Q,Y/N)K, whereas the union utility function has the following form, U = NV 
+ (Ns -N)V*, where V and V* are the union members’ utilities for, respectively, 
the employed and the unemployed. These utilities are functions of the 
consumption wage and elements of the wedge between consumption and product 
wage. V* should also contain a set of variables that may influence the workers' 
well-being. The result of the Nash-bargaining solution is a general wage function 
of the form:
W/P = W [ Y/N, Z, U, P*E/P ]
where Z is a set of wage pressure elements and P*E/P is the level of 
competitiveness.
Thus the bargain outcome is real wage which, in turn, depends on productivity 
and on a set of indicators of the outside opportunities for workers. Similar 
solutions may be provided by different models (e.g. efficiency-wage; monopoly 
union model) and may be related to Sargan (1964) and Kuh (1967) type equations 




























































































2. A VAR Model for Wage-Setting
Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted over the period 1976:1-1993:3. The 
system is in five stochastic variables x’ = [(w-p), jt, (p-q), u, h,] with the intercept 
restricted to lie in the cointegration space. We use w, s the wage variable, 
earnings per employee in the Italian manufacturing industry.2 The price variable p, 
is the consumption prices index, while q, is the output price (value added 
deflator), ut stands for the aggregate unemployment rate and 7t, for the average 
labour productivity in the manufacturing industry.
The vector x’ includes the (per capita) hours worked in the "large firms" h, (firms 
with more than 500 employees) as a proxy for hours worked in the manufacturing 
sector. All the variables are in logs (the log of the unemployment rate represents 
the convex relationship between labour market pressure and wage growth), and 
non-stationary time series. However, for the variables w, and p„ conventional unit 
root tests and graphs of their first differences do not suffice to rule out that they 
are 1(2) whereas the real wage (w-p)t appears 1(1) (see Table A.l in the 
Appendix).
The VAR is augmented by two shift dummy variables: Dummy 1(=1979:2- 
1980:4=1) and Dummy2 (=1981:4=1; 1982:1=1), which have been set as 
unrestricted. The first dummy accounts for the short run effects concerning the 
second oil shock, whereas the second one takes into account two anomalous data 
relative to the working hours variable.
The model is conditioned on S, and S,.i , where S measures the hours lost for 
labour conflicts. This variable (1(0)) is presumed to be weakly exogenous and to 
have only short-run effects.
In order to test for cointegration, we conduct our analysis using a VAR with 2 
lags on all stochastic variables. The appropriateness of the lag order was tested 
commencing with a system lag length of four (using likelihood ratio test adjusted 
for degree of freedom).
With k=2 lags, the VAR model can be represented in a vector error-correction 
(VECM) form:
Ax, = TAx,.| + rix + TD, + u, ; u, -  N i i d (0,L) (1)
where T, = -(I-Aj ), n =  -(I-A, -A; ) and Aj is an (nxn) matrix. The vector D, is a 
set of conditioning variables: non-stochastic variables such as intervention or shift 




























































































if its rank is equal to r<n, a representation of n  such that n =  a(3’ exists, where a  
and |3 are both (nxr) matrices.
This model is a cointegrating transformation of a VAR model (see Hendry 1995; 
Johansen 1995, among others). It can be regarded as a multivariate generalization 
of a model in differences with an ECM and if r<n, the matrix (3' xt.2 . embedded in 
(1), represents up to (n-1) error correction mechanisms in the multivariate model, 
which ensure that the x, converge to their long-run steady state solutions.
The estimation is carried out over the period 1976:1-1993:3 using recursive least 
square (RLS). Diagnostic tests (reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix) show a 
good descriptive power of the system.3 None of the test is significant at the 1% 
level and only an autocorrelation statistic for ht matters at 5%.
Cointegration Analysis
Testing for cointegration in the five-equation system provides the result reported 
in Table A.3, where p stands for eigenvalue, Max and Tr are, respectively, the 
maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistics. As in the standard notation, the P 
matrix represents the estimated cointegrating vectors and the a  matrix contains 
the relative weights (i.e. the adjustment coefficients).
Both the test statistics, testing the null of no cointegration, suggest that there is 
evidence of two cointegrating vectors (and three common trends) in the data set, 
given by the first columns of the p matrix. The hypothesis is supported by the test 
statistics adjusted for degrees of freedom (see Osterwald-Lenum 1992 for the 
asymptotic critical values) and by the analysis of the companion matrix of the 
VAR model (the matrix A of equation (1)). Following the suggestion of Juselius 
(1995), where the model is conditioned on dummies and weakly exogenous 
variables, we should look for additional information that can support the choice of 
stationary relations. In fact.variables included in the conditioning set D, affect the 
asymptotic distributions and, therefore, the critical values provided by the 
Johansen procedure (and others) can be considered only as indicative.
All the nxk = 10 roots of matrix A are inside the unit circle and the three largest 
roots have as modulus, 0.9845, 0.9151 and 0.9151. (the fourth largest root is 
0.576). This supports the choice of (n-r)=3 common stochastic trends and two 
stationary relations.
It is well known that any linear combination of the stationary vectors, found in the 




























































































direct interpretation of pi may not necessarily be interesting from the economic 
point of view. However, the analysis of the individual Pj shows that the first 
unrestricted vector looks like a long-run wage function with theoretically 
expected signs. The second unresticted vector may be interpreted as a price 
equation. From the a  matrix it seems that pi should not appear in the equations 
for Au, and Ap,, the variables being weakly exogenous for the long run relations.
Chart 1 (in the Appendix) plots the error corrections for the six components of the 
P matrix, showing that the first two (cointegrating vectors) look fairly stationary, 
and the disequilibrium is not large.
Identification restrictions were attempted on the unrestricted cointegrating 
vectors. In particular we test a number of structures, theoretically motivated, on
( (w-p), it, u, (p-q), h, const) e Sp(P)
In particular, the hypotheses tested were expressed as hypotheses about a 
restricted vector in the space spanned by the first two cointegration vectors, and 
they may classified in groups: in the first group, the stationarity of the real wage 
and each of the variables is tested (for instance, is real consumption wage around 
the productivity trend stationary? and so on). In the second group, hypotheses 
regarding whether an estimated combination of unemployment and productivity 
and a combination of unemployment and price wedge, cointegrate. A further 
group involves the working hours variable and the real wage. The likelihood ratio 
tests, asymptotically distributed as yj with the appropriate degrees of freedom, 
indicated that stationarity had to be rejected for all the cases.
These results imply that combinations of at least three variables are needed to 
find cointegration. Therefore, we imposed r-1 exactly identifying restrictions and 
a normalizing coefficient on each cointegration vector, raising a number of 
testable questions (for instance, whether real consumer wage around the 
productivity trend cointegrates with the unemployment rate). This process ends 
up with the following description of the cointegrating space:
Pi (w-p) = 7t - 0.114u - 1.9(p-q) -0.30h - 5.4ly.
P: (w-p) = 0.4837t + 0.277h - 6.07y.




























































































Two restrictions were imposed on the seond vector and one on the first. The LR 
test for these hypotheses, distributed as a %2 (1) under the null gives a value of 
0.2266 [0.634],
The restrictions on identifying the two separate cointegrating vectors have been 
tested jointly with testing for u and 7t being long-run weakly exogenous for both 
the stationary relations. The LR test for these joint hypotheses is X  (4) = 7.242 
[0.203], indicating that we cannot reject these reductions at a 5% level.
An Economic Interpretation o f Cointegration Vectors
Dickey, Jansen and Thornton (1991) emphasize that, in general, cointegration 
vectors cannot be interpreted as representing structural equations because they 
are obtained from the reduced form of a system where all of the variables are 
jointly endogenous.
Structural results are difficult to extract from the reduced form equations. 
However, they could be thought of as representing constraints that an economic 
structure imposes on the movement of the variables in the system in the long-run. 
Thus, we have two linear combinations for which the variance is bounded. To this 
regard, Johansen (1995c) points out that the foremost problem that one should 
consider is to build a statistical model that describes the data well, and express 
the economic theory in terms of the parameters of the statistical model.
If a structural relation is modelled by stationary relations (cointegrating relations) 
and if the property of stationarity and non-stationarity can be deducted from the 
reduced form, then the cointegrating relation captures the economic notion of a 
long-run economic relation. In fact, the multivariate model (1) is given in ECM 
form, but it is essentially a statistical description of the data. When the data are 
1(1), the process [x, } contains information about the equilibrium forces and the 
adjustment towards long-run stedy states and the driving forces that push the 
economy out of equilibrium (see also Juselius 1993).
The two cointegration relations seem support the existence of a long-run real 
wage relation. According to Johansen and Juselius (1994), it seems plausible to 
assume that the long-run structure may cointain evidence about two behavioral 
relations (in this case, unions versus firms). Therefore our stationary relations 
may be interpretable, respectively, as a "supply" (firm) real wage relation and a 
"demand" (union) real wage relation. This interpretation seems to be supported by 
the fact that the first relation includes variables correlated with the "supply" (the 




























































































uncorrelated with the "demand". These hypotheses have been tested on the 
coefficients as over identifying restrictions.
Furthermore, the different sign of the coefficient found for the worked hours 
variable in the two relations, seems consistent with this interpretation. If hours are 
increased (and employment reduces for a while), wages pressure will reduce and 
the amount of work available will have to be increased. Employment will revert 
to its former level. However, a rigid labour market may obstruct these 
movements.
The last question is whether the estimated coefficients are economically 
meaningful. Cointegrated systems must be interpreted cautiously. The coefficients 
of the cointegrating relation cannot be interpreted as elasticities. This is true even 
if the variables are in logs, because all the other dynamic relations between the 
variables which are specified in a VAR model are ignored. Liitkepohl (1991; 
1994) shows that the ceteris paribus assumption may not have a meaning. The 
analysis requires that short-term dynamics and intertemporal adjustment 
processes generated by equilibrium errors are taken into account. Inpulse 
response analysis, taking into account the full system, may provide a more 
reliable conclusion. This means that the coefficients provided by the cointegration 
analysis are only indicative.
To summarize, the analysis of the long-run structure of the data in terms of 
stationary cointegration relations provides the following results:
(i) the hypothesis that real consumer wages cointegrate with labour 
productivity is rejected as is the stationarity of real wages and the unemployment 
rate, whereas the hypothesis that these two cointegrate with price wedge and 
working hours is accepted. This relation cannot interpreted individually. A further 
equation describes the equilibrium relations between the five variables.
(ii) The possibility that the "wage gap" (defined as (w-p)-tat) cointegrates 
with the working hours variable is not rejected by the data.
(iii) The low degree of wage flexibility implies weak equilibrating 
mechanisms.
(iv) Finally, it is worth stressing that restricting the unemployment effect to 




























































































3. The Short-Run Structure
Now we map the data to 1(0) series using first differences of the variables, 
reformulating the model with the error-correction terms explicitly included, ECM) 
and ECM2. The system determines four variables: A(w-p),, A(p-q) t , Ah, and 
Au Table A.4 (in the Appendix) reports some model statistics of the 
parsimonious VAR model (PVAR), obtained dropping the variables with F-tests 
for the nullity on the retained regressors and adding two identities for the 
cointegrating vectors. The PVAR satisfies the properties of parameter costancy 
(see Chart 2: 1-step residuals with ±2o and individual equation break-point Chow 
test), normality and homoskedasticity. The multivariate test for autocorrelation is 
significant at the 5% level; mostly due to the proxy variable h ,.
Imposing specific restrictions on each equation (dropping insignificant 
regressors), we procede to estimate a simultaneous (structural) model using the 
FIML procedure (Table 1). The LR test of over-identifying restrictions indicates 
that the structural model encompasses parsimoniously the conditional PVAR: %" 
(26)=31.23[0.220]. The multivariate tests suggest that the model has 
approximately white noise, normally distributed errors.
It should be noted that the short-run behaviour of the weakly exogenous variable 
p, is not modelled, being zero the coefficients of A y [ y ’= (w-p), (p-q), h, u] and, 
therefore, strongly exogenous: y , is not the Granger cause of n ,. On the contrary. 
Table 1 shows that although the change in unemployment rate does not react to 





























































































Real wage model. Structural Model (FIML)






Dummy 1 -0.011042 -3.614
Au_l 0.039776 3.211





Dummy 1 0.025202 3.118
EC M 2ll -0.14124 -3.214






E quation 4 fo r Ah
Variable Coefficient t-vaue
Au_l 0.11372 3.204
A 7t 0.61845 4.532
Aïï_l -0.20539 -1.321
ECM 1_1 -0.10975 -1.228
ECM2_1 0.24935 2.173
Dummy2 0.046912 5.691
Vec.ARl-5 F(80.160)= 1.4394 [0.0267]* 






























































































The dominant features of the estimated model are:
-i) lagged unemployment and labour productivity do not enter significantly in the 
wage equation, while the long run equation shows a long-run productivity 
coefficient equal to unity.
The lack of evidence of short-run effects of productivity changes on real wages 
implies that a fall in productivity growth determines a wage gap (as in the 1980s).
-ii) The cointegration vector Pi shows that unemployment carries a long-run 
coefficient of 0.114; moreover, it seems to be weakly exogenous for the 
parameters of both the stationary relations.
Hence, our empirical analysis implies considerable less long-run wage 
responsiveness to unemployment as compared to the findings in many 
multicountry studies.
Changes in the unemployment rate do not affect wage growth, whereas changes 
in the latter increase the unemployment rate. This result will be confirmed by the 
inpulse-response analysis (carried out below, see Charts 5-5.3) and can be found 
only in a multivariate context, often neglected by the macroeconomic literature.
Following Nymoen (1992), one may state that if real wage does not drift too far 
from productivity over time, that is if the wage gap w-p-Ajt is stationary, then 
there is wage flexibility. Our results confirm serious rigidity, showing that wage 
gap cointegrates with unemployment, worked hours and relative prices.
-iii) We find, however, support for the wage curve (as defined by Blanchflower 
and Oswald 1994a,b): a relationship between the level of (real) pay and the 
unemployment (and local unemployment) rate. Although here the wage curve is a 
long-run equilibrium relationship, the estimated unemployment coefficient (-0.11) 
appears to be approximately the same as that found in many countries through the 
microeconometric analysis of Blanchflower and Oswald.4 However, as discussed 
in Section 2, this is only indicative, the coefficients do not represent elasticities. 
Considering the short-term dynamics of the full system we reach a quite different 
result (see Section 5).
It is useful to conclude the discussion on wage-unemployment relationship 
mentioning some limitations on analysis. When bargaining is centralized or co­
ordinated, unemployment takes on a key role. We should expect, therefore, a 




























































































depends on the extent to which wages are indexed. Moreover, the Italian labour 
market presents a remarkable dualism, with the Northern labour market close to 
full-employment and the Southern regions characterized by an unemployment rate 
of around 20%.5 This indicates that some "dispersion" variable should be 
included in the wage equation to capture a short-run effect for demand pressure 
(e.g. the seminal paper by Archibald 1969).6
The importance of the dualistic nature of the Italian labour market has been 
investigated introducing the unemployment rate of the northern regions of Italy 
into the model. The long-run equilibrium model is found to be not so different 
from the standard model discussed above. Three main results emerge from the 
FIML estimate. First, the long-run equilibrium unemployment coefficient is - 
0.103. Second, changes in the northern unemployment rate do lead to wage 
reactions in the short run. Third, the short-run unemployment rate is no longer 
determined by changes in real wage.7
On the contrary, the southern unemployment rate is insignificant both in the short- 
and long-run (see also Bodo and Sestito 1991). Obviously all of this has strong 
policy implications. For instance, if wage increases are determined in low- 
unemployment regions one may reduce unemployment in other regions without 
worsening wage inflation. This policy intervention, involved by a "kinked” 
Phillips curve, horizontal at the wage growth corresponding to the southern 
regions, is extremely difficult in Italy, where national and sectorial wage setting is 
not a function of regional unemployment and productivity.8
-iv) An implication of the above conclusions is that outsiders having no role in 
wage determination may generate high unemployment persistence (e.g. Blanchard 
and Summers 1986. Lindbeck and Snower 1987. Blanchard 1991).
-v) As expected, real wage adjustment to deviations from disequilibria is rather 
sluggish: the estimated speed of adjustment parameter is -0.14.
-vi) The short-run effect of the wedge (p-q) is rather strong; the estimated short- 
run dynamic impact is -0.34. A negative and permanent (long-run) price effect is 
also provided by the cointegration restrictions. Any expansionary macro-policy 
which affects the relative price between domestic output and consumption, 
reducing the real product wage, increases employment.
-vii) The hours lost for labour conflicts have a positive (although modest) short- 





























































































-viii) Both unemployment and productivity are significant in the relative price 
equation but the signs seems to suggest a counter-cyclical effect.
4. An Alternative Wage Model
In a previous section, we noted that the nominal variables w, and p, might be 1(2). 
From the graphs of the data and unit roots tests it seems indeed that the first 
differences of these variables could be descibed by a 1(1) process.
Instead of introducing the variable (w-p), one can eliminate the 1(2) component 
working with inflation rate Apt and wage growth Aw, . It is plausible, from the 
economic point of view, to assume lack of homogeneity in the short-run, although 
this implies a short-run wage and price equation in second differences.9
The variables used in this model are the same as for the real wage model. 
However the model is characterized by a new conditioning set D ,, which includes 
two dummies: dummy3 (1979:4-1980:1=1) to account for the second oil shock 
and dummy4 (1981:1=1) to cope with an outlier. With the variables Aw,, Ap,, 7t„ 
u ,, (p-q), h , we can repeat the 1(1) analysis. The results are reported in Table A.5 
in the Appendix.
The trace test and maximal eigenvalue test now suggest the existence of three 
cointegrating vectors in the data, whereas test statistics adjusted for degrees of 
freedom suggest two stationary relations. The additional information given by the 
12 roots of the companion matrix seems to support three common stochastic 
trends (the first largest root, 0.987, is followed by a complex pair of roots with 
modulus 0.86) and, therefore, three cointegration relations (see Chart 3).
It is interesting to note that, unlike the unrestricted estimates p, of the real wage 
model, now the unrestricted eigenvectors can be given a direct interpretation in 
terms of hypothetical relations. The first p vector primarily reflects a price 
equation. The second cointegration vector seems to suggest a stationary relation 
describing the wedge (between consumer and producer prices) long-run 
determinants, while the third vector suggests a stationary relation between wage 
and price growth, and unemployment and productivity.
By imposing some restrictions on each cointegration vector and on the associated 
a matrix we obtain the following long-run relations as economically acceptable 




























































































Ap = Aw + 0.479(p-q) - 0.09k
(p-q) = Ap - 0.105Aw + 0.236k - 0.105h
Aw = Ap - 3.92(p-q) - 0 .17u + K - 0.82h
The restricted cointegration vectors, tested for lying in the cointegration space 
yield %2 (12) = 9.9131 [0.6236]. Three restrictions were imposed on the first 
vector and two on the second and third vector.
From a statistical point of view, testing for cointegration between variables 
(differences) that require to be differenced twice to induce stationarity and other 
1(1) variables (levels) is appropriate. From an economic point of view, 
determining a general formulation of overidentifying restrictions on the individual 
equations is more difficult.
The first cointegration vector describes price growth. Long-run movements in 
prices and wages are correlated. Moreover, we find that long-run increases in the 
ratio between producer and consumer prices in part will be counteracted by an 
increase in the real wage growth. There is a long-run tendency for the wage 
growth to follow labour productivity. The second cointegration vector suggests a 
positive association between the wedge between consumer and producer prices 
and labour productivity and a negative relation between the price wedge and the 
wage growth. This seems consistent with a price setting based on unit costs. 
These variables cointegrate with the worked hours variable. The third stationary 
relation is a plausible long-run wage equation. A Phillips curve augmented by 
productivity and prices. A rigid labour market may lead firms to use working 
hours which reduce wage increases. In the long-run, rises in the wedge are bom 
entirely by labours (see Modigliani et al 1986; Padoa Schioppa 1986 for 
permanent tax effects for Italy. See also Layard et al. 1991). This result confirms 
the one found for the real wage model.
Notice that in this model the constant term does not appear in the cointegrating 
relations. This result may indicate that static equilibrium is a very restrictive long 
run solution for this model. According to this explanation, the constant term in the 
long run equation of the previous (real wage) model depends on the steady state 
growth rate of the exogenous variables. On the contrary, the present model does 
not include exogenous variables in the long-run, and rates of wage and price 
growth are explicitly included in the cointegration analysis.
Parsimony has been achieved by removing the insignificant regressors in the 
VAR model in 1(0) space, and testing whether this reduction in the model is 
supported by an F-test. The diagnostic results from estimating the parsimonious 




























































































and the recursive properties of the model (Chart 4) are satisfactory. The model 
has constant coefficients and white noise, normally distributed errors.
The structural model, estimated in FIML, is reported in Table 2. The model 





























































































TABLE 2: Nominal wage model. Structural Model (FIML)









Equation 2 for Au
Variable Coefficient t-vaue
Au J -0.28731 -2.784





S J 0.052859 2.323
Equation 3 for AAp
Variable Coefficient t-vaue
Au J 0.031799 2.670
AAp J -0.30397 -3.941
AAwJ -0.082128 -2.540
ECM 1J -0.037223 -4.967
ECM 2J 0.014461 3.289
ECM 3J -0.12472 -4.566









ECM 2J 0.035973 10.879
ECM3_I -0.29211 -6.264
dummy4 0.026180 3.867
Equation 5 for Ah
Variable Coefficient t-vaue
Au J 0.091435 2.106
AAp J 0.58008 2.022
Art -0.67234 -3.708
ECM 2J 0.047000 2.314
ECM 3J -0.30957 -3.011
Constant 0.42958 2.253
Vector AR 1-5 F( 125.162)= 1.2749 [0.0731] 
Vector normality y'( 10 )= 12.47 [0.2548] 





























































































There are a number of features worthy of comment:
i) as in the real wage model, it is clear that the phenomenon of the unemployment 
hysteresis does appear in the wage model.
ii) As in the real wage model, unemployment matters only in the long-run, and is 
inversely related to wage growth (with a coefficient of -0.17).
We cannot restrict the long-run Phillips curve to be vertical: setting 
unemployment to be zero throughout the cointegrating space yields 
(5)=38.6396[0.000]. Thus, considering a vector time series which follows a 
VECM process, we cannot conclude that the Italian data are strongly supportive 
of the wage curve rather than the Phillips curve.
iii) Using regional (North-South) unemployment rates we may prove results 
analogous to the real wage model ones: the northern unemployment rate has a 
slightly stronger effect than the aggregate unemployment rate, whereas the 
restriction to zero of the coefficient for the southern unemployment rate is not 
rejected by the data (results are provided upon request).
iv) Unlike the real wage model, unemployment cannot be considered weakly 
exogenous for the equilibrium parameters, whereas labour productivity should be 
considered exogenous to the system.
v) The effect of "unexpected" changes from wage and price setting, are rather 
different in the respective equations (see also the impulse-response analysis 
reported below). An increase in wage growth yields a negative dynamic impact of 
0.082 on the acceleration of prices, that relative to a change in inflation on the 
acceleration of wages is 0.629. The extent of nominal inertia in wage setting 
depends negatively on the extent of indexation (for most of the sample Italy is 
characterized by a high wage indexation). Inertia is also inversely related to the 
extent of synchronization and wage contract renewals in Italy are more or less 
synchronized in the manufacturing sector. With stickier nominal wages (a partial 
and backward-looking indexation mechanism limited the real wage rigidity in the 
very short-run), real wage decreases in the short run because of unexpected 
increases in prices. Short-run price homogeneity does not seem to be present.
vi) There is evidence (although the t-value is rather low) of a negative 
relationship between unemployment changes and favourable productivity shocks. 
Further notable features of the unemployment equation are the strong effects of 




























































































5. Impulse Response Analysis
In charts 5-5.3 we show the responses of the variables to a one-time impulse in, 
respectively, A(w-p), , A(p-q), , Au, and Ah, , of size one standard deviation. 
Therefore, the units at the vertical axes equal to the standard deviations of the 
residuals corresponding to the variables whose effects are considered. Impulse 
response analysis amount to dynamic simulation, from an initial value of zero, 
where a shock at t=l in a variable is traced through (see. Lutkepohl 1991; 
Liitkepohl and Reimers 1992).'°
For instance, in the first chart, a real wage innovation is seen to induce the 
unemployment rate to grow for one period and then it converges to zero. The 
impulse leads to a permanent (long-run) increase in the level of u, . This is a 
consequence of the nonstationary features of the data. Unemployment seems to 
settle at a different equilibrium value. The real wage innovation has no significant 
effects on Ah, and A(p-q),.
In Chart 5.1 the effects of an impulse in D(p-q), are displayed. This leads to a 
short-run decline in real wage and, therefore, the shock improves unemployment 
and worked hours.
The effect of the shock in any of the variables dies away quite rapidly in the sense 
that the differences of all the endogenous variables return to their previous values 
if no further shocks hit the system. This means that the system is stable. Notice, 
however, that the impulse in A(p-q), generates significant permanent effects on 
(w-p), and u, . These variables do not return to their previous equilibrium values. 
The dynamics of the ECM, contains information about the equilibrating forces 
that make the process (the variables) adjust towards long-run steady states.
Chart 5.2 shows there is no significant effect on real wage due to an increase in 
Au,. These results indicate a low degree of wage flexibility. Therefore, 
unemployment does not Granger-cause the other variables of the system whereas 
the converse is true. Finally, the response of A(w-p) , to an impulse in Ah , is 
clearly insignificant.
Innovation responses of the nominal wage model are depicted in Charts 6-6.2. 
The reaction of the variables does not contrast sharply with the previous results, 
although there is an obvious difference in the dynamic reaction of the variables 
A:p, and A:w, , and in the speed of adjustment of the ECM , . An important issue 
is whether the extent of indexation attenuates nominal inertia in wage setting. 






























































































The paper investigates the degree of real wage flexibility and real wage resistance 
in the Italian economy. Since wages and prices are of order 1(2), we use two 
wage models for solving the higher nonstationary order of these variables: we 
replace the 1(2) variables with a 1(1) alternative by reformulating the model to 
consider real wages and, subsequently, by using their first differences. Although 
the latter specification implies an unusual short-run wage equation in second 
differences, we show that the main characteristics of wage determination are the 
same but the models reveal additional information: imposing homogeneity in the 
short-run may be not appropriate even in a high indexed economy.
Interesting results have been found concerning the empirical evidence of a long- 
run wage curve and the existence of a Phillips curve. In a multivariate context the 
short-run Phillips curve disappears: changes in unemployment do not affect 
wages, whereas increasing wages rise unemployment. As the estimated models 
imply low (if any) responsiveness of wages to variations in unemployment, they 
generate unemployment persistence.
Cointegration analysis shows that one cannot reject a long-run trade-off between 
unemployment and wage growth, but a different result is reached if the full 
system is taken into account: there is no significant permanent (or transitory) 
effect on real wage (or wage growth) due to a transitory increase in 
unemployment.
The unemployment effect on wage essentially reflects the demand pressure in the 






























































































1) See also Padoa Schioppa (1990), Lucifora and Sestito (1993), Baici e 
Dell’Aringa (1994); Checchi (1995). There is a growing interest on microdata 
analisys but a few works are available. See, for instance, DelfAringa and 
Lucifora (1990), Erikson and Ichino (1994) among others. They can provide 
interesting insights on the process of wage setting that cannot be gained from the 
aggregate data. For instance, the empirical work on wage drift in Italy conducted 
by Ordine (1996), using annual data (1983-1988) on the published accounts of 
105 Italian three-digit industries, shows that insider factors (productivity, 
inventories, insider workers power) are extremely relevant in determining the 
wage drift while the rate of unemployment has a prominent role in determining 
minimum contractual wages.
2) Labour input is measured in the National Account data in standardized labour 
units. These measure the labour input in terms of full-time workers, taking into 
account the informal economy (irregular workers; second job; work done by 
illegal immigrants).
3) In order to keep the length of this paper within reasonable limits, the full 
output result is not reported. Further results may be provided by the authors upon 
request.
4) We did not find evidence in favour of strong convexities in the wage curve. 
See, for instance, K.Johansen (1995).
5) The difference between regional unemployment rates remained steady at 
around 6 percentage points during the first half of the 1980s. At the beginning of 
the 1990s the differential reached 14 percentage points.
6) A variable used by Archibald (1969) to measure the degree of the dispersion of 
the local unemployment rates around the over-all figure is a2 = Z"=, x„ (u,, -u, )2, 
where n = number of labour markets, X, = proportion of the total labour force in 
market i and u, = unemployment rate in that market, but it might be useful to 




























































































7) Wage and unemployment dyanamics is described by the following equations 
(standard errors in bracket):
A(w-p), = -0.312A(w-p) ,.| - 0.042Aun,,.) - 0.45A(p-q) n  + 0.013S ,.|
(0.099) (0.021) (0.229) (0.006)
- 0.027Dummyl - 0.145ECM2,.,
(0.007) (0.043)
AuN,t = -0.248AuN,t-i + 0.244A(w-p) ,.i - 1.287Apn +0.046S,.i 
(0.116) (0.453) (0.578) (0.026)
- 0.032Dummyl 
(0.037)
where u„ = unemployment rate (northern regions). The full system is provided 
upon request.
8) For the problems of the interdependence of wage bargains, the wage-leading 
regions and wage differentials and the role of actual and potential migration 
(mobility), see Bodo and Sestito (1991).
9) Software programs incorporating the 1(2) features of the Johansen approach 
(see Johansen 1995(a,b) and Juselius 1995) are not available. Butter and 
Wijngaert (1992) do not adopt this specification and attempt to achieve a 
cointegration regression under the presumption that wages, the wage space (price 
inflations plus productivity growth) and its component parts are of order 1(2).
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Table A.l: Unit root Tests
C ritical
Series ADF Values Model 0
p -1,845 -3,476 C,T
Ap -4,214** -3,476 C,T
u -1,659 -2,904 C
Au -3,263* -2,904 C
(p-q) -2,064 -3,476 C,T
A(p-q) -5,315 ** -3,476 C,T
Aw -2,087 -2,904 C
AAw -8,137** -2.904 C
(w-p) -2.886 -3,476 C.T
A(w-p)-4,796 ** -3,476 C,T
S -3,027* -2,904 C
h -1.712 -2,904 C
Ah -3,691** -2.904 C
UN -1,694 -2,904 C
AUN -2,92* -2,904 C
Ap -1,637 -2,904 C
AAp -4,121** -2,904 c
° Similar test
C: ADF(5) with Constant;
C,T: ADF(5) with Constant and Trend;
V ariables and sources
p labour productivity ISTAT
u unemployment rate ISTAT
P consumer price index ISTAT
q value added deflator (manufacturing industry) ISTAT
w wage (manufacturing industry) ISTAT
S hours lost in labour conflicts ISTAT
h per capita worked hours** ISTAT
UN unemployment rate, North of Italy ISTAT
* per standard labour unit





























































































Real wage model. 
Diagnostic Tests: VAR 1(1)
p :AR 1-5F(5,50)= 1.9606 [0.1009] 
(w-p) :AR 1 -5F(5,50)=0.78514[0.5653] 
(p-q) :AR 1-5F(5,50)=2.0402 [0.0889] 
u :AR 1-5F(5,50)=2.2162 [0.0671] 
h :AR 1-5F(5,50)=3.17 [0.0146]* 
p :Norm. x \ l ) ~  2.0223 [0.3638] 
(w-p) :Norm. x 2(2)= 2.8326 [0.2426] 
(p-q) :Norm. %:(2)= 1.5567 [0.4592] 
u :Norm. x 2(2)= 1.248 [0.5358] 
h .Norm. x 2(2)= 3.9121 [0.1414] 
p :ARCh4 F(4,47)=l.67582 [0.6121]
(w-p) :ARCh4 F(4,47)=0.68242 [0.6076]
(p-q) :A RCh4F(4,47)= 1.2297 [0.3111] 
u :ARCh4 F(4,47)=0.13402 [0.9691 ]
h :ARCh4 F(4,47)=0.76195 [0.5553]
p :HET F(20,34)=0.75588 [0.7427] 
(w-p) :HET F(20.34)=0.53151 [0.9311] 
(p-q) :HET F(20.34)= 1.0437 [0.4439] 
u :HET F(20,34)=0.74645 [0.7524] 
h :HET F(20,34)=0.78967 [0.7074] 
Vec.ARl-5 F(125,132)=1.2761 [0.0838] 
Vec.normality x‘( 10)= 13.146 [0.2156] 
Vec.HET F(300,284)=0.73354 [0.9959]
TABLE A.4 
Real wage model. 
Diagnostic Tests: VAR 1(1)
A(p-q) :AR 1-5F(5,51 )= 1.0527 [0.3974] 
A(w-p) :AR 1 -5F(5.51 )= 1.2299 [0.3088] 
Au :AR 1-5F(5,51)=1.4718 [0.2154]
Ah :AR 1-5F(5.51)=5.6594 [0.0003]**
A(p-q) :Norm. x 2(2)=2.9758 [0.2259] 
A(w-p):Norm. x2(2)=0.54405 [0.7618]
Au :Norm. x 2(2)=0.26012 [0.8780]
Ah :Norm. x2(2)=0.79904 [0.6706]
A(p-q) :ARCh4 F(4,48)=0.10423 [0.9805] 
A(w-p) :ARCh4 F(4.48)= 1.2758 [0.2926] 
Au :ARCh4 F(4.48)=0.20105 [0.9366]
Ah :ARCh4 F(4,48)=0.77152 [0.5491 ]
A(p-q) :HET F(21,34)=0.51916 [0.9418] 
A(w-p):HET F(21,34)=0.74014 [0.7637] 
Au :HET F(21,34)= 0.4298 [0.9776]
Ah :HET F (21,34)=0.55999 [0.9179]
Vec.AR 1-5 F(80,132)=1.3911 [0.0466]* 






























































































Real wage model. Cointegration analysis
p: 0.462179 0.383195 0.207429 0.0882889 0.0675254 4.42744e-015
H o:rank=p M ax Max° 95% T r Tr° 95%oIIIICl 42.18** 35.97* 34.4 101.9** 86.9** 76.1
p <= l 32.86* 28.03 28.1 59.71* 50.93 53.1
P< =  2 15.81 13.48 22.0 26.85 22.9 34.9
p < =  3 6.285 5.361 15.7 11.04 9.416 20.0
IIVCl 4.754 4.055 9.2 4.754 4.055 9.2
Max=maximum eigenvalue statistic; Tr=trace statistic; 
° =small sample correction
standard ized b eigenvectors
P (w-p) (p -q ) u h C onstant
1.000 -0.3237 -3.596 -0.1761 -0.9024 -0.6462
1.777 1.000 -8.360 -0.5438 -2.776 8.977
1.237 -2.476 1.000 -0.04138 0.2554 -13.23
-2.062 4.319 -3.373 1.000 6.232 -10.02
-0.6892 2.078 1.317 - -0.8203 1.000 6.088
standard ized a coefficients
P 0.03041 -0.03787 -0.08620 -0.002652 -0.01601
(w-p) 0.001281 -0.04810 0.09459 -0.002580 -0.01544
(p-q) 0.1662 0.0008411 -0.003952 0.003121 0.004066
U 0.3289 -0.02597 -0.0007584 -0.05530 0.02876





























































































Nominal wage model. Cointegration analysis
p: 0.653355 0.490702 0.408387 0.0945457 0.0749002 0.0154549
H o:rank=p M ax M ax0 95% T r Tr° 95%
p = =  0 72.04** 59.33** 39.4 166.7** 137.3** 94.2
p < =  1 45.88** 37.78* 33.5 94.68** 77.97** 68.5
p < =  2 35.69** 29.39* 27.1 48.8* 40.19 47.2
p < =  3 6.754 5.562 21.0 13.11 10.79 29.7
p <= 4 5.294 4.36 14.1 6.353 5.232 15.4
p <= 5 1.059 0.8722 3.8 1.059 0.8722 3.8
Max=maximum eigenvalue statistic; Tr=trace statistic; 
° =small sample correction








standard ized  a  coefficients
P 0.002350 0.02890 -0.1580
Au 0.2661 0.006795 -0.6898
Ap 0.02972 0.004064 -0.2625
Aw -0.1848 0.0008371 -0.5120
(p-q) 0.01503 -0.02618 -0.1230










































































































Nominal wage model. Diagnostic Tests: VAR 1(0)
A(p-q) : AR 1-5F( 5, 50) = 
Au : AR 1-5F( 5, 50) = 
AAp :A R 1 -5 F (5 ,50) = 
AAw : AR 1-5F(5, 50) = 
Ah : AR 1-5F( 5, 50) = 
A(p-q) : Normality x:(2)=
Au : Normality X '{ 2 ) =  
AAp : Normality X ~ {2 )=  
AAw : Normality (2)=
Ah : Normality x 2( 2)= 
A(p-q) : ARCh 4 F( 4, 47) = 
Au : ARCh 4 F( 4, 47) = 
AAp : ARCh 4 F( 4, 47) = 
AAw : ARCh 4 F( 4, 47) = 
Ah : ARCh 4 F( 4, 47) = 
A(p-q) : HET F(23, 31) = 
Au : HET F(23, 31) = 
AAp : HET F (2 3 ,31) = 
AAw : HET F (2 3 ,31) = 
Ah : HET F(23, 31) = 
Vector AR 1-5 F( 125,132) = 
Vector normality x 2( 10) = 
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